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Introduction: Hurricanes have increased in severity over the past 35 years, and climate change 
has led to an increased frequency of catastrophic flooding. The impact of floods on emergency 
department (ED) operations and patient health has not been well studied. We sought to detail 
challenges and lessons learned from the severe weather event caused by Hurricane Harvey in 
Houston, Texas, in August 2017.
Methods: This report combines narrative data from interviews with retrospective data on patient 
volumes, mode of arrival, and ED lengths of stay (LOS). We compared the five-week peri-storm 
period for the 2017 hurricane to similar periods in 2015 and 2016.
Results: For five days, flooding limited access to the hospital, with a consequent negative impact 
on provider staffing availability, disposition and transfer processes, and resource consumption. 
Interruption of patient transfer capabilities threatened patient safety, but flexibility of operations 
prevented poor outcomes. The total ED patient census for the study period decreased in 2017 (7062 
patients) compared to 2015 (7665 patients) and 2016 (7770) patients). Over the five-week study 
period, the arrival-by-ambulance rate was 12.45% in 2017 compared to 10.1% in 2016 (p < 0.0001) 
and 13.7% in 2015 (p < 0.0001). The median ED length of stay (LOS) in minutes for admitted 
patients was 976 minutes in 2015 (p < 0.0001) compared to 723 minutes in 2016 and 591 in 2017 
(p < 0.0001). For discharged patients, median ED LOS was 336 minutes in 2016 compared to 356 
in 2015 (p < 0.0001) and 261 in 2017 (p < 0.0001). Median boarding time for admitted ED patients 
was 284 minutes in 2016 compared to 470 in 2015 (p < 0.0001) and 234.5 in 2017 (p < 0.001). 
Water damage resulted in a loss of 133 of 179 inpatient beds (74%). Rapid and dynamic ED process 
changes were made to share ED beds with admitted patients and to maximize transfers post-
flooding to decrease ED boarding times. 
 
Conclusion: A number of pre-storm preparations could have allowed for smoother and safer ride-out 
functioning for both hospital personnel and patients. These measures include surplus provisioning 
of staff and supplies to account for limited facility access. During a disaster, innovative flexibility of 
both ED and hospital operations may be critical when disposition and transfer capibilities or bedding 
capacity are compromised. [West J Emerg Med. 2020;21(3)586-594.]
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Population Health Research Capsule
What do we already know about this issue?
Studies suggest that ED patient volume falls 
during a major storm event and rises after. Travel 
to the hospital is a challenge for both patients 
and staff.
What was the research question?
What impact did Hurricane Harvey have on ED 
operations at an urban county hospital and what 
lessons can we learn?
What was the major finding of the study?
Advanced preparation is critical, as are flexibility 
and innovation in situations such as multi-day 
flooding and damage to hospital infrastructure.
How does this improve population health?
As flooding becomes more common in the US, 
anticipating the need to function independently 
when normal operations are impaired will protect 
the well being of patients and staff.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, Atlantic hurricanes have increased in 
severity, duration, and frequency, resulting in more category IV 
and V hurricanes with devastating impacts.1 Hurricane Harvey, 
which made landfall on August 25, 2017, as a category IV 
hurricane, reached the Houston area by August 26, 2017. Over 
four days, one trillion gallons of rain fell over Harris County, 
leaving 70% of the county under at least 1.5 feet of water.2 
Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Katrina share the title 
of costliest hurricanes in United States (US) history, with the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimating 
$125 billion in damage.3 Sixty-eight deaths are directly 
attributable to Hurricane Harvey, of which 96% were due to 
flooding. A 2017 systematic review by Saulnier et al concluded 
that given the challenges associated with gathering data during 
natural disasters, information describing the relationship between 
health and flooding events is limited but important to understand 
given that about half of weather-related disasters in the last 20 
years were floods.4
In addition to a hurricane’s direct impact on life and 
property, hurricanes can have important effects on healthcare 
operations, particularly hospital emergency departments (ED).5,6 
Previous studies have reported a bimodal patient-volume surge.7 
Pre-storm, increased patient volume may ensue in hospitals 
that receive patients from surrounding hospitals and facilities 
that face mandatory evacuation.7 In contrast, a relative decrease 
in ED patient arrival has been observed during hurricane 
landfall, which may be attributed to transportation difficulties 
during heavy rainfall and widespread flooding.8 Post-storm, 
patient volumes usually rise in affected areas and may persist, 
highlighting the potential for long-term impact on an ED 
following high-intensity hurricanes.7,8,9 
The primary objective of this report was to describe the 
experience during Hurricane Harvey in narrative form at Lyndon 
Baines Johnson (LBJ) General Hospital’s ED, providing details 
of the challenges and preparation strategies that may have value 
for future storm events. The secondary objective was to describe 
patient volumes and lengths of stay (LOS) during and after 
Hurricane Harvey in comparison to control time periods without 
major storms.
METHODS
This retrospective, mixed-methods study was approved for 
waiver of consent by the University of Texas Houston Health 
Science Center Institutional Review Board. The study and 
narrative reports were captured from an urban, academic county 
hospital with 91,000 annual visits. LBJ General Hospital is a 
Level 3 trauma center, which had a single intensive care unit at 
the time of the storm. Certain specialty services are shared with 
a partner county hospital. Under normal circumstances, patients 
in need of neurosurgery or spinal surgery, for example, are 
transported from LBJ to a partnering hospital.
Prior to Hurricane Harvey, LBJ was the second busiest ED 
in Houston. The nearest hospital with an overlapping catchment 
area, East Houston Regional Medical Center, closed during 
Hurricane Harvey due to flood damage and never reopened. LBJ 
absorbed many of its patients, quickly becoming the busiest ED 
in the city.
Qualtitative Data Acquisition
We conducted semi-structured interviews with an emergency 
medicine (EM) faculty member and the hospital administrator 
who were both present in the facility during Hurricane Harvey. 
Three nurses, selected at random, and two residents were also 
interviewed and provided review to ensure consistency of 
recollections. To ensure accuracy we also consulted written works 
published immediately post-storm10. No variations were found. 
Quantitative Data Acquisition
LBJ’s information technology (IT) department queried 
the existing electronic health records (EHR) for the requested 
time intervals, which were a five-week time period surrounding 
Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 landfall, as well as control periods in 
2015 and 2016. Specifically, we obtained data for the week prior 
to the storm, the week of the storm, and three weeks post-storm 
for analysis. Time periods corresponding to the same weeks 
of the year during 2015 and 2016 were used for comparison. 
We collected data on ED census (volume of visits per day), 
demographic details (age, race/ethnicity, gender), arrival mode 
(ambulance vs non-ambulance), Emergency Severity Index, ED 
disposition, and LOS. ED disposition was further categorized into 
admitted and non-admitted patients. Admitted patients included 
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those hospitalized or transferred to another facility. Patients were 
classified as non-admitted if they were deceased, discharged, 
screened and referred, or sent to Labor and Delivery, as well as 
those who left against medical advice or left without being seen or 
completing treatment. All data points were provided in aggregate 
from IT from existing records; no EHR or other resources were 
directly searched or reviewed by research personnel.
The data set included 22,487 cases in total. Of these, 7665 
cases corresponded to the 2015 study period, 7760 cases in 
2016, and 7062 in 2017. Overall, the data included 105 days of 
observations, with 35 days corresponding to each year of study. 
Days of each of the included years were further ordered as values 
from -7 to 28, with value 0 representing the date Hurricane 
Harvey arrived (8/26/2017). The correspondent dates for years 
2015 and 2016 were set as 8/29/15 and 8/27/16, respectively.
Data Analysis
We reported the frequencies, measures of central tendency, 
and percentages for categorical variables, such as gender, 
ethnicity, admissions, and arrivals by ambulance per year of 
study. Univariate analysis was used to compare characteristics 
of the periods of study, with the reference period as 2016. We 
compared categorical variables using chi-square testing, and 
we analyzed continuous variables using t-tests or the Wilcoxon-
Mann Whitney test if the distribution was not assumed to be 
normal (ie, when comparing LOS).
Additionally, we performed an analysis of covariance to 
understand the trends between the periods of study by using 
days as the unit of analysis. Data was collapsed by adding 
events occurring on the same day for nominal variables and by 
calculating the overall median of each LOS category per day. 
We set the period of days under study per year as independent 
categorical variables using days of year 2016 as reference values, 
while the variables of interest, such as admissions per day or 
arrivals by ambulance per day, were dependent variables in each 
analysis. A probability value of < 0.05 (two-tail) was considered 
statistically significant for all tests. We performed all analyses 
using Stata IC 15 (StataCorp LLC, College Station, TX).
RESULTS
Facilities and Operations
Heavy rains and high winds ravaged the areas surrounding 
LBJ beginning August 25, 2017, and within two days,vehicles 
and ambulances could no longer access the hospital, which 
was surrounded by six feet of water for the following five days. 
Patients arrived on foot and via trucks, high-water vehicles, 
helicopters, boats, and makeshift rafts. Once the streets 
surrounding the hospital became accessible, those living in 
communities closest to the hospital began to arrive. However, 
highways continued to be impassable, and hospital employees 
living outside the area could not relieve in-hospital personnel.
During Hurricane Harvey, LBJ sustained 250 water 
penetrations. Of the 179 total inpatient beds, 133 were closed 
secondary to damage. As a result, one of the two 16-bed bays in 
the ED was reallocated as an inpatient unit following approval 
from the State of Texas. In addition to patients seeking treatment, 
LBJ was inundated with displaced storm refugees seeking shelter. 
However, some individuals who initially only sought food and 
shelter also developed mediical needs since they were without 
necessary medications. During the five-day course, 183 storm 
refugees were sheltered in a large annex area separate from the 
ED, consuming some of the hospital’s resources.
Notable Cases
While searching for a missing family member during the 
storm, a patient sustained a head injury after a fall from his 
all-terrain vehicle. Emergency medical services (EMS) placed 
him in a cervical collar but were unable to reach LBJ, instead 
transferring him to a dump truck for transport. Upon arrival, 
his head computed tomography (CT) revealed a large subdural 
hematoma. The ongoing storm rendered immediate EMS 
transport to a hospital with neurosurgical capabilities impossible, 
prompting hospital executive leadership to contact the Coast 
Guard. However, the patient’s neurological status declined 
rapidly, and physicians realized the Coast Guard helicopter would 
likely not arrive in time.
The on-call trauma surgeon had completed two years of 
neurosurgery training before changing surgical subspecialties. 
Given the concern for increasing intracranial pressure and 
the risk of herniation and death, it was determined that while 
efforts to evacuate the patient were ongoing, the surgeon would 
perform an emergent craniotomy. After assembling a makeshift 
neurosurgical tray with the necessary equipment from an array of 
services, the surgeon performed the first ever craniotomy at LBJ. 
Approximately two hours post-surgery, the Coast Guard landed 
at an improvised landing area, and the patient was transported 
to a hospital with neurosurgical capabilities where he recovered 
without deficits.11
A second notable case was that of a patient in third-degree 
heart block with a ventricular escape rhythm. Emergency 
physicians placed a transvenous pacemaker (TVP), but there 
were no cardiology fellows or faculty onsite to manage 
post-admission complications. Because LBJ does not have a 
coronary care unit, patients requiring a higher level of cardiac 
care are usually transferred—an impossible task during the 
immediate aftermath of the storm. Despite not routinely 
managing TVPs, the medical intensive care unit (MICU) cared 
for the patient for several days before ultimately transferring 
him for permanent pacemaker placement.
Most internal medicine (IM) faculty had left post-rounds 
on August 26, so house staff were alone on site during and post-
storm, with the exception of a lone hospitalist and MICU faculty. 
Fortunately, power and telecommunications were never lost, so 
IM faculty were able to review EHRs remotely and communicate 
with their residents.
ED Staffing and Basic Needs/Personal Care
At LBJ, hospital leadership executed disaster planning for 
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hospital staff well in advance of the storm. A full complement of 
nurses, technicians, and ancillary staff were present for the storm 
ride-out and aftermath. In preparation for possible flash flooding, 
the hospital leadership had made arrangements early in the day 
on Friday, August 25, to gather and sequester ride-out teams who 
arrived prepared with supplies. Therefore, hospital staffing was 
robust during the storm’s aftermath.  
In contrast, medical staffing at LBJ was less structured in 
its approach to disaster planning. Because it was believed there 
would be enough time to make arrangements once flooding 
materialized, early staffing contingencies were not solidified. 
Because the change of shifts occurred on Saturday, August 26, 
before the heavy rainfall ensued, faculty left the hospital, and 
only two EM faculty physicians were on duty when the storm 
began. Additional faculty who attempted to drive to the hospital 
encountered impassable roads.
In addition to two EM faculty, there was an EM third-year 
resident, two advanced practice practitioners, and two interns 
one month into their residency. The team’s relative inexperience 
meant EM faculty needed to provide a high-level of supervision 
while the team managed boarding and arriving patients. Sleep 
schedules were developed to allow 8-12 hours between periods of 
clinical work, but because there were only two faculty members 
their periods of uninterrupted rest were limited.  
The hospital administrator had arranged for cots and meals 
for staff. However, calculations for dietary supplies were based 
on initial hospital census plus ride-out staffing but did not account 
for the storm refugees and patients who arrived. Given that 
supply delivery was not possible due to inaccessibility, items in 
the vending machines were quickly consumed. To mitigate the 
risk of running out of food, meal service was decreased from four 
to three times per day, and the hospital cafeteria switched from 
serving individual items to casseroles, which was a more efficient 
use of ingredients. 
Personal care needs presented more complications for the 
hospital. The hospital did not have laundry service on site; hence, 
clean linen supplies and towels were exhausted over time. The 
paper scrub supply was also depleted as scrubs were given to 
storm refugees who were soaked from wading through flood 
waters. The hospital administrator authorized distribution of 
surplus items, such as T-shirts left over from hospital celebrations. 
Further, there were limited showering facilities, creating two-hour 
queues for those trying to shower near their units.
From outside the hospital, the ED chair worked to bring 
relief for staff and faculty, but many of the city’s resources were 
dedicated to evacuating people from flooded homes. Eventually, a 
high-water vehicle was designated to assist, and the water receded 
enough for replacement personnel to arrive after five full days. 
Patient Characteristics and Volume
Table 1 displays baseline LBJ ED volumes and patient 
characteristics during 2015, 2016, and 2017 over a five-week 
period, beginning one week prior to Hurricane Harvey. Over 
the full time period, the LOS for both admitted and discharged 
patients declined in 2017, despite a five-day boarding period 
during the storm. The proportion of patients arriving by 
ambulance was higher in 2017 when compared to 2016, 
although not higher than the similar time period in 2015. 
A better understanding of the patient volume and mode of 
transport differences can be gained by looking in more detail at 
the timeline presented in the figures.
In 2017, there was a large decrease in patient volume and 
a corresponding increase in the percentage of patients brought 
in by ambulance beginning at approximately time 0, when 
Hurricane Harvey battered Houston (Figures 1 and 2).
When the flood waters receded post-storm, there continued 
to be a relative paucity of ED beds because water-damaged 
inpatient rooms remained closed, leading to increased ED 
boarding and fewer ED beds that could be used for ED 
throughput. Adaptive and innovative strategies were undertaken 
to manage having fewer beds, which will be described in 
greater detail in the following section.  
DISCUSSION
This is the only study we are aware of that has specifically 
assessed the impact of Hurricane Harvey on ED operations. 
Through both qualitative and quantitative assessment, we 
found useful data that may help other EDs prepare for a storm. 
Most centers experience a volume surge after a hurricane. 
After Hurricane Hugo (1989), ED volumes increased by 19% 
during the three weeks following the storm and remained high 
for three months,6 while Hurricane Andrew (1989), Hurricane 
Isabel (2003), and Superstorm Sandy (2012) led to even 
greater post-storm patient-volume surges of 35-40% in certain 
emergency centers.7,9,12 In the case of LBJ, a patient surge was 
not seen. Some potential patients may not have been in the area 
since thousands of storm refugees were housed in the city’s 
convention center and at other central locations farther from the 
hospital. 
LBJ passed environmental testing to begin reopening 
closed inpatient beds seven weeks after the storm’s landfall. 
As a result, the ED adapted by transferring patients to other 
hospitals around or outside the city until hospital capacity 
normalized. Another strategy to manage fewer ED and inpatient 
beds was to change ED patient flow. A flex area was created, 
which acted as “quick care” for minor problems and housed 
ED patients who were awaiting the results of diagnostic testing 
and reassessment. Keeping patients who were not critically 
ill “vertical” in chairs (rather than lying in beds) was a key 
strategy, allowing for the treatment of a maximum number of 
patients who needed emergency care at LBJ.13
The processes of keeping ED patients “vertical” and 
initiating transfers early were associated with a lower LOS 
in 2017 when compared to previous years. As shown in 
Figure 1, approximately one week post-storm, the patient 
volume returned to normal, pre-storm levels. Other hospital-
level changes, including postponing elective admissions and 
procedures, as well as a new focus on capacity management by 
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nursing leadership, further contributed to generating capacity 
for ED patients. Despite having fewer available beds, Figures 
3 and 4 show that approximately 10 days post-storm when 
changes were implemented, there was a sharp decline in 
patients’ median ED boarding time.
EDs and hospitals should be prepared to be self-sufficient 
during and directly after a severe storm, as our experience and 
others’ experiences have shown.5,14,15 Disaster planning drills have 
been found to be effective in preparing staff for their roles,14,16-18 
and had there been more drills with their associated focus on pre-
planning and defined policies and roles, provider staffing during 
the ride-out could have been considerably different.
Roads may be impassable both during and after the 
storm.14,15,19 As we saw, both EM and other providers were 
unable to reach the facility. Pre-disaster, consideration should 
be given to which subspecialists and supplies may become 
necessary if normal transfer processes are unavailable. In-
hospital call might be needed for certain specialists, since the 
specialists may be unable to reach the hospital, or the hospital 
could endure power outages, thereby limiting communication.14 
Early arrival times should be considered if shift/call start 
times coincide with the storm’s anticipated arrival so that 
staff members are not endangered by storm conditions. Key 
leadership should also consider being on site during a major 
storm’s ride-out for operational decision-making.6,15,20
Selection of personnel for anticipated prolonged duty in 
an environment requiring adaptability and personal discomfort 
should be part of hospital disaster planning. Accounting 
for staff well being is crucial when planning for multi-day 
disasters, as performing duties outside of normal routine is 
common.21 Overall, work shifts should be centered on safety 
and staff endurance.6,15,21 Therefore, staffing decisions should 
consider providers’ need for rest, meaning that more providers 
than usual will likely be required to be in-house to sustain a 
safe work rotation. 
Arrangements for sleeping quarters and provisioning of 
food, water, and other unique needs should be established in 
advance. When considering supplies, administrators should base 
estimates accounting for storm refugees who may arrive at the 
hospital for shelter. In the wake of a disaster, estimating food 
and water provisions is challenging given that supplies will 
probably be needed for more individuals than those originally 
accounted for.14,15,21,22 
Individuals should consider ways that they can be self-
sufficient in the event that conditions require it. Bringing 
non-perishable food, bottled water, personal hygiene items, 
personal medications, and sleeping gear may be helpful.14,15,21 
The Harris Health System, which includes LBJ Hospital, has 
Variable
2015 
8/22-9/25 P-value
2016
8/20-9/23
(Reference) P-value
2017 
8/19-9/22
Total patients 7665 7760 7062
Age 41.1 (18.5) 0.002 42.0 (17.8) <0.0001 43.13 (18.32)
Ethnicity <0.0001 0.85
Hispanic 4236 (55.9) 4595 (59.8) 4137 (59.41)
Non-Hispanic 3346 (48.9) 3088 (40.2) 2827 (40.59)
Arrival by ambulance, n (%) <0.0001 <0.0001
Yes 1009 (13.7) 772 (10.1) 844 (12.45)
No 6331 (86.3) 6900 (89.9) 5936 (87.55)
ESI, mean (SD) 2.9 (0.72) < 0.0001 3.0 (0.75) 0.40 3 (0.77)
ED disposition, n (%) 0.09 0.43
Admitted/observation 1216 (15.9) 1154 (14.9) 1023 (14.49)
Discharged 6448 (84.1) 6606 (85.1) 6038 (85.51)
ED LOS: admitted patients,
median minutes (IQR)
n = 1216
976 (606-1490)
< 0.0001 n = 1154
723 (481-1099)
< 0.0001 n = 1023
591 (412-953)
ED LOS: discharged patients, 
median minutes (IQR)
n = 6448
356 (226-543)
< 0.0001 n = 6604
336 (216-505)
< 0.0001 n = 6036
261 (157-412)
Boarding time: admitted or observation, 
median minutes (IQR)
n = 1183
470 (211-921)
< 0.0001 n = 1120
284 (142-554)
< 0.001 n = 974
234.5 (117-508)
Boarding time: discharged patients, 
median minutes (IQR)
n = 5731
22 (11-42)
0.22 n = 5782
23 (12-40)
0.10 n = 5544
22 (12-39)
Table 1. Comparison of differences in patient’s characteristics, length of stay, and boarding time for years 2015 and 2017, with 2016 as the 
reference year.
ESI, Emergency Severity Index; ED, emergency department; LOS, length of stay; IQR, interquartile range; SD, standard deviation.
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a disaster plan that outlines that its employees are responsible 
for bringing personal items, including food and water, when 
participating in a hurricane ride-out. However, as evidenced 
by the depletion of vending machines and the rationing of food 
for patients, refugees, and staff, additional supplies brought 
by employees were not enough for the duration of the storm. 
Following Hurricane Katrina, a post-storm survey revealed 
that staff at Charity Hospital did not fully understand that 
bringing a seven-day supply of food was their responsibility.21 
As only 20% of responders indicated that they understood this 
responsibility, Brevard et al recommend that details of personal 
responsibilities, such as bringing personal supplies, should be 
reinforced annually when refreshing employees on disaster- 
planning protocols and performing disaster drills.21
Disaster planners should also recognize that staff may 
themselves be victims of the storm.15,19,23 During Hurricane 
Harvey, one member of the ED staff lost a son. Another member 
of the housestaff had to arrange the rescue of his wife and 
family while trapped at LBJ. These occurrences led the hospital 
administrator to recommend that a mental health counselor be 
part of the ride-out team to support staff and patients who are in 
need, which has been suggested in previous literature.19,24,25
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Figure 1. Number of visits to the Lyndon B. Johnson Hospital emergency department by period of study.
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Figure 2. Number of patients who arrived by ambulance by period of study.
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LIMITATIONS
This report has several important limitations. The 
qualitative data that is presented in narrative form is 
retrospective in nature; therefore, interviews are subject to recall 
bias. Wherever possible, the providers’ accounts were verified 
by multiple sources, including articles written closer to the time 
of the event. A larger sampling of staff could also have been 
useful to provide additional data for qualitiative analysis.
The analyzed data were also collected retrospectively. 
While investigators attempted to match the storm’s time period 
to similar ones in prior years by selecting the same days of 
the week and season of the year, it is possible that other time 
periods would have been more representative. Further, it may 
have been of use to track a longer timeline than five weeks, 
since disaster conditions in the city continued for much longer. 
Prospective data collection would be preferred, with details on 
the challenges recorded during and immediately after the storm. 
CONCLUSION
Early and thorough preparation by leadership and 
individual team members can alleviate some stresses that result 
from being on duty in the ED during severe storm and flooding 
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Figure 3. Median length of stay for admitted patients by period of study.
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Figure 4. Median length of stay for discharged patients by period of study.
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events. Both the hospital and the medical staff should have 
defined disaster-operations procedures in place before a storm 
event, with goals of being self-sufficient on both a facility and 
individual level and of having excess resources on site. Our 
experience of water damage and decreased accessibility to the 
hospital was similar to what other facilities have described. We 
did not experience patient-volume surges that other studies have 
reported; however, we had a relative surge in the ED volume 
since many beds were occupied by non-ED patients and normal 
admission processes were curtailed. Despite bed closures, ED 
LOS and boarding decreased relative to similar time periods, 
which may have been due to the dynamic operational changes 
and the shifting of resources initiated by the administration 
team during the disaster. Flexibility and innovation are key in 
adapting ED operations to overcome the challenges created by 
disaster conditions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Harris County Hospital District, Dr. James J. McCarthy, 
Dr. Katheryn Larimore, and Dr. Richard Witkov. 
Address for Correspondence: Kimberly A. Chambers, MD, 
McGovern Medical School at UTHealth, Department of 
Emergency Medicine, 6431 Fannin Street, JJL 271, Houston, TX 
77030. Email: kimberly.a.chambers@uth.tmc.edu.
Conflicts of Interest: By the WestJEM article submission agreement, 
all authors are required to disclose all affiliations, funding sources 
and financial or management relationships that could be perceived 
as potential sources of bias. No author has professional or financial 
relationships with any companies that are relevant to this study. 
There are no conflicts of interest or sources of funding to declare.
Copyright: © 2020 Chambers et al. This is an open access article 
distributed in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution (CC BY 4.0) License. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/
REFERENCES
1. Walsh J, Wuebbles D, Hayhoe K, et al. Ch. 2: “Our changing climate.” 
In: Melillo JM, Richmond TC, Yohe GW, eds. Climate Change Impacts 
in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment. 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Global Change Research Program; 2014. 
Accessed May 26, 2018.
2. Di Liberto T. Reviewing Hurricane Harvey’s catastrophic rain and 
flooding. Climate.gov. 2017. Available at: https://www.climate.gov/
news-features/event-tracker/reviewing-hurricane-harveys-catastrophic-
rain-and-flooding. Accessed May 26, 2018.
3. Blake ES, Zelinsky DA. National Hurricane Center tropical cyclone 
report: Hurricane Harvey (AL092017). 2018. Available at: https://www.
nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_Harvey.pdf. Accessed May 26, 2018.
4. Saulnier DD, Ribacke KB, von Schreeb J. No calm after the storm: a 
systematic review of human health following flood and storm disasters. 
Prehosp Disaster Med. 2017;32(5):568-79. 
5. Stratton SJ, Tyler RD. Characteristics of medical surge capacity 
demand for sudden-impact disasters. Acad Emerg Med. 
2006;13(11):1193-7.
6. Sheppa CM, Stevens J, Philbrick JT, et al. The effect of a class IV 
hurricane on emergency department operations. Am J Emerg Med. 
1993;11(5):464-7.
7. Stryckman B, Walsh L, Carr BG, et al. Impact of Superstorm Sandy on 
Medicare patients’ utilization of hospitals and emergency departments. 
West J Emerg Med. 2017;18(6):1035-41.
8. Platz E, Cooper HP, Silvestri S, et al. The impact of a series of 
hurricanes on the visits to two central Florida emergency departments. 
J Emerg Med. 2007;33(1):39-46. 
9. Quinn B, Baker R, Pratt J. Hurricane Andrew and a pediatric 
emergency department. Ann Emerg Med. 1994;23(4):737-41. 
10. When Harvey hit. TMC Pulse: News of the Texas Medical Center. 
October 9, 2017;4(9):12.  
Available at: http://www.tmc.edu/news/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/
october_pulse_press_low-res-final.pdf. Accessed May 26, 2018.
11. Galehouse M. The craniotomy crew. TMC Pulse: News of the Texas 
Medical Center. October 9, 2017;4(9):22-23. Available at: http://www.
tmc.edu/news/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/october_pulse_press_low-
res-final.pdf. Accessed May 26, 2018.
12. Smith CM, Graffeo CS. Regional impact of Hurricane Isabel on 
emergency departments in coastal southeastern Virginia. Acad Emerg 
Med. 2005;12(12):1201-5. 
13. Chambers KA, Rogg J, Sharma K, et al. How Hurricane Harvey 
spurred a Houston hospital to rethink emergency care. Harvard 
Business Review. May 7, 2018. Available at: https://hbr.org/2018/05/
how-hurricane-harvey-spurred-a-houston-hospital-to-rethink-
emergency-care. Accessed September 11, 2018.
14. Levinson, DR. Hospital emergency preparedness and response during 
Superstorm Sandy. Office of Inspector General Report. J Healthc Prot 
Manage. 2015;31(1):31-50.
15. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. (2018). ASPR 
Healthcare System Recovery Guide: Hurricane Harvey. Available at: 
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/events/hurricanes2017/Documents/
TX-HC-Recovery-Guide-10July2018.pdf. Accessed August 15, 2019.
16. Flynn, SE. Higher ground: the sophisticated healthcare response of the 
SouthEast Texas Regional Advisory Council (SETRAC) to Hurricane 
Harvey. Global Resilience Institute at Northeastern University. 
February 2018.
17. Scott, LA, Swartzentruber DA, Davis CA, et al. Competency in chaos: 
lifesaving performances of care providers utilizing a competency-based 
multi-actor emergency preparedness training curriculum. Prehosp 
Disaster Med. 2013;28(4):322-33.
18. Kaji AH, Lewis RJ. Assessment of the reliability of the Johns Hopkins/
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality hospital disaster drill 
evaluation tool. Ann Emerg Med. 2008;52(3):204-10, 210.e1-8.
19. Morris AM, Ricci KA, Griffin KC, et al. Personal and professional 
challenges confronted by hospital staff following Hurricane Sandy: a 
Western Journal of Emergency Medicine 594 Volume 21, no. 3: May 2020
Impact of Hurricane Harvey on Healthcare Utilization and ED Operations Chambers et al.
qualitative assessment of management perspectives. BMC Emerg 
Med. 2016;16(1):18.
20. Pole T, Marcozzi D, Hunt RC. Interrupting my shift: disaster 
preparedness and response. Ann Emerg Med. 2014;63(5):584-8.
21. Brevard SB, Weintraub SL, Aiken JB, et al. Analysis of disaster 
response plans and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
learned from a level I trauma center. J Trauma. 2008;65(5):1126-32. 
22. Lane K, Charles-Guzman K, Wheeler K, et al. Health effects of 
coastal storms and flooding in urban areas: a review and vulnerability 
assessment. J Environ Public Health. 2013;2013:913064.
23. Haynes BE, Freeman C, Rubin JL, et al. Medical response to 
catastrophic events: California’s planning and the Loma Prieta 
earthquake. Ann Emerg Med.1992;21(4):368-74.
24. Neria Y, Nandi A, and Galea S. Post-traumatic stress disorder following 
disasters: a systematic review. Psychol Med. 2008; 38(4):467-80. 
25. Schwartz RM, Tuminello S, Kerath SM, et al. Preliminary assessment 
of Hurricane Harvey exposure and mental health impact. Int J Environ 
Res Public Health. 2018;15(5):974.
